Moral Support and Performance

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Abstract

This study presents unique empirical evidence on the importance of moral support for performance. We take advantage of an unusual change in Argentinean football legislation. In August 2013, as a matter of National security, the Argentinean government forced all teams in the first division to play their games with only home team supporters. Supporters of visiting teams were not allowed to be in stadiums during league games. We estimate the effect of this exogenous variation of supporters on team performance, and find that visiting teams are, on average, about 20% more likely to lose without the presence of their supporters. As a counterfactual experiment, we run the analysis using contemporaneous cup games, where the visiting team supporters were allowed to attend, and find no effect of the ban on those games. Moreover, the ban does not seem to bias the decisions of referees, the lineups or the market value of the teams, suggesting that the effect on team performance is due to the loss of moral support rather than other factors. Finally, we find that moral support is more relevant when there is equal power between the two teams, suggesting that moral support compensates the power of monetary resources. This paper provides a proof of concept of moral support as an important non-monetary resource, even in settings with high monetary incentives.

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Keywords: Moral Support, Encouragement, Behavioral Changes, Motivation, Non-monetary Incentives, Competitive Environments

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1 INTRODUCTION

Moral support is defined as giving support to a person or cause, without making any contribution beyond the emotional or psychological value of the encouragement. As humans, we spend considerable time supplying and demanding moral support. We use pep talks, encouraging words, and similar unverifiable soft information to boost confidence and "motivate" others. Billions of dollars are spent in books and counseling by people who pay to be inspired and motivated. Encouragement, praise and motivation strategies are a central theme in management, coaching, education and political marketing (Kinlaw 1999).

According to Albert Bandura, the way moral support can improve performance is by enhancing self-confidence beliefs (Bandura 1986)[1]. As shown by Albrecht et al. (2014), verbal rewards praising one's competence enhance perceived self-determination, increase intrinsic motivation and activate brain areas associated with subjective valuation of situations, suggesting that people have a higher subjective value for succeeding in a task after verbal reinforcement. In line with this evidence, moral support is formalized in Economics as a confidence enhancement strategy in a principal-agent model (Benabou & Tirole 2003). In such a model, the agent has imperfect knowledge about her own ability and the principal, who has stakes in the agent's performance, can send a signal that the agent is of a high ability type to boost agents' self-confidence and consequently improve her performance.

Despite its prevalence and importance, the evidence of the effect of moral support on behavior is rather scarce. The major empirical challenge resides in the fact that moral support is essentially endogenous. People choose whether to supply or demand moral support, the extent of it, to whom to supply it and from whom to demand it. For example, better performing people (being children, students, workers, or teams) attract higher support (from parents, teachers, bosses or fans) and, at the same time, people who receive more support perform better. This imposes a real challenge for identification of the causal relationship between moral support and human behavior.

This paper addresses this challenge by taking advantage of an exogenous negative shock on moral support caused by an unexpected change of law in the Argentinean football league. Following an incident in which a football supporter was killed, the authorities decided to implement a drastic measure in the form of a ban forbidding the presence of visiting teams supporters during first division games. After the law, only home team supporters could attend while the visitors stands remained empty. This provides an unusually clean oppor-

[1] There is ample evidence of the behavioral effects of self-confidence in different domains like education, labor and competitive sports (Stajkovic & Luthans (1998); Bandura (2000); Bandura & Locke (2003)).

tunity in a real-world environment to discern the effect of moral support on behavior.

Using data from 1320 games played before and after the introduction of the ban, we document a solid negative effect of the ban on the performance of visiting teams. Specifically, the probability that a visiting team loses a game increases by about 20% without their supporters. Moreover, the odds that the visiting team concedes an additional goal more than the home team increases by 1.3 times with the law. These effects are robust to different specifications, sample restrictions, time and season fixed effects and different time trends. As robustness check, we run a counterfactual test using data from contemporaneous cup games, where the visitors' supporters were allowed to attend. We find no effect of the ban on these games, which provides additional empirical support to our main finding.

Once we establish the effect of the ban on visiting team performance, we provide evidence suggesting that the ban does not affect performance other than through its effect on moral support. First, we find that the ban does not seem to increase referee hostility towards visiting teams. After the law, referees are neither more likely to give red or yellow cards to visiting players nor to inflict more penalties against visiting teams. Second, we show that the ban does not affect the players' market value. Third, we provide evidence that managers do not respond strategically to the ban and do not change the lineup of their teams for home versus away games. Finally, we show that lack of moral support affects smaller teams more, and it affects bigger teams only when they play against other big teams. This suggests that moral support compensates the power of monetary resources.

Previous research shows that providing children with moral and emotional support like verbal praising, company and attention from teachers, mentors or parents improves school performance (Behncke (2012); Darolia & Wydick (2011)) and prosociality (Kosse et al. 2019) and reduces depression and chronic mental health conditions in adulthood (Shaw et al. 2004). Moreover, it has been shown that the risk of academic failure among children can be moderated by support from teachers (Hamre & Pianta 2005) and parental involvement (Auerbach 2009). Another set of studies evaluates the impact of support through mentoring programs on graduate students. In an important contribution, Oreopoulos & Petronijevic (2018) find that a one-to-one coaching program providing regular support to university students has large effects on academic performance. A challenge that this literature faces is to isolate pure *moral* support that parents, mentors and teachers provide from the *practical* support they give in the form of information and knowledge.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper providing well identified field evidence on moral support, and its causal effect on performance in a highly competitive and professional environment. The most related strand of the literature analyzes the effect of support on children and students behavior Albrecht et al. (2014). We complement this literature in two important ways. First, we leverage a natural setting in which the aspect of practical support is not present. In this way, we can study the effect of moral support in isolation. Second, in the literature of education, monetary incentives to students are not typically present. We add to this literature by showing the effect of moral support in a setting where monetary incentives exist and are high.

More generally, this paper adds to the behavioral economics literature highlighting the effectiveness of various forms of non-monetary incentives on motivation and performance (Deci (1971); Frey & Jegen (2001); Gneezy et al. (2011)). For instance, Deci (1971) shows that providing praise increases students' willingness to work on a puzzle. More recently, in a controlled field experiment with students, Bradler et al. (2016) find that unexpected public recognition by means of a thank-you card increases students' group performance. Davies & Fafchamps (2017) show that the presence of positive verbal feedback from the employer to the worker, when associated with a relatively high wage, has a positive effect on workers' effort provision. We complement this literature by showing evidence of moral support as an effective non-monetary incentive in a highly competitive labor environment with high monetary incentives in place. In particular, our results can offer a possible explanation of the results found by Kassis et al. (2021). They show that teams whose captains can decide about the penalty shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout, but they are unable to identify a particular mechanism for this. If winning a coin toss is perceived as a moral boost that increases self-confidence and performance, then our paper can provide a mechanism consistent with their findings.

Finally, this paper contributes to the economics literature using sport data to understand human behavior (see Palacios-Huerta (2014) for an excellent review). Apesteguia & Palacios-Huerta (2010) use data on football penalty kicks to identify the effect of psychological pressure on the probability of scoring, depending on the order of kicks.[2] Feri et al. (2013) find that the effect of psychological pressure in competitive environments is moderated by individual differences on cognitive anxiety. Related to this literature, this paper provides clean evidence of how moral support contributes to a well-established phenomenon in the sport economics literature: home advantage. Home advantage refers to a greater success rate in home versus away competitions. It is a robust phenomenon that has been consistently highlighted in sport competitions both individually (e.g. Koning (2011)) and in teams (e.g. Gómez & Pollard (2011); Liardi & Carron (2011); Priks (2013); Peeters & van

[2] See also Kocher et al. (2012) for a replication study.

Ours (2021)).[3] According to this literature, the main reasons for the existence of home advantage are familiarity with the context, travel fatigue, territoriality and referee bias caused by the pressure of the crowd. Garicano et al. (2005) show that social pressure biases football referees toward home teams.[4] We show that this channel does not seem to play a role in the context of our study.

Recently, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, there has been a proliferation of studies on home advantage, exploiting the opportunity represented by the complete lack of supporters in football stadiums. The general finding reinforces the existence of home advantage due to referee bias as a consequence of social pressure (Cueva (2020); Dilger & Vischer (2020); Ferraresi & Gucciardi (2020); Endrich & Gesche (2020); Sors et al. (2020); Bryson et al. (2021); Scoppa (2021); Fischer & Haucap (2021); Cross & Uhrig (2022)). We believe that compared to the Covid-19 shock in European football leagues, the exogenous change we exploit in Argentina offers a cleaner identification of a pure shock on moral support. First, Covid-19 did not only affect the presence of people in stadiums, but also changed a multiplicity of factors that could affect team performance. Second, Covid-19 affected the presence of supporters of home and visitor teams alike. Banning all supporters can have differential effects on home and visiting teams and the marginal effects on the final score (or likelihood of winning) might therefore be confounded by an inability to identify the effects of moral support for home and visiting teams separately. In contrast, the Argentinean shock affected only the number of supporters of the visiting teams, which sharpens the identification of the change in moral support. Finally, the universality of the Covid-19 shock does not allow the presence of a contemporaneous counterfactual. In the case of Argentina, we exploit the fact that the ban of the visiting team was only for *League* games and not for *Copa Argentina* games, which we use as a counterfactual experiment.

Our result that, on average, visiting teams are about 20% (8 percentage points; 0.18 standard deviation) more likely to lose without the presence of their supporters is sizable, but consistent with recent literature reporting that when no supporters are allowed (for example, due to Covid-19), home teams win less often.[5] That is, having a crowd in the

[3]For a comprehensive review see Carron et al. (2005); Pettersson-Lidbom & Priks (2010) and Pollard (2006).

[4]See also Dohmen & Sauermann (2016) for a survey on referee bias.

[5]For example, Cross & Uhrig (2022), using data from the five major European Leagues, report that playing without visitors and home supporters (due to Covid-19) decreased the probability that a home team wins by 5.4 p.p. Cueva (2020) using data from 41 different professional leagues shows that the percentage of games won by away teams goes from 29% to 33% during the lock-down. Fischer & Haucap (2021) found that in the Bundesliga, the proportion of games won by home teams was reduced by 14% for closed door games during Covid-19 lock-down. Scoppa (2021) analyzed the results of 34852 (917 closed door) games from 9 leagues in 5 different countries, and find that, during the closed door games (due to Covid-19), the home advantage with respect to points obtained was significantly reduced. With the presence of the crowd, home teams received

stadium (which is almost always leaning more heavily towards the home team) seems to contribute to the well-known home advantage in football. This paper goes one step further by showing, with a cleaner natural experiment than Covid-19, what happens when there is a crowd, but no supporters of the visiting team are admitted. By the logic of the home advantage in response to having an audience, one would expect an even stronger home advantage when visiting teams' supporters are banned, and this is exactly what this paper shows.[6]

2 Context and Data

2.1 Context

Since the conception of professional football in Argentina in 1931, violence around football games has been a constant problem for the country. According to the NGO "Salvemos al Fútbol", up to date, 334 people have died due to violence episodes in Argentinean football games. Despite the implementation of different safety measures, such as increasing the number of police agents in games or installing security cameras in the stadiums, the magnitude of the problem has only worsened with time. Excluding the massive tragedy of 1968 during a River Plate vs. Boca Juniors game[7], the overall trend over the past century indicates an increasing number of deaths, achieving its maximum in the triennium 2012-2014. Figure A.1 in appendix reports the evolution of the number of victims in Argentinean football from 1934 to 2014.

The 10th of June 2013 marked a turning point in the history of Argentinean football. During the first division (Primera División) game between Club Atlético Lanús and Estudiantes de La Plata, a Lanús supporter was killed by a police rubber bullet shot. Following this incident, the AFA (Asociación de Fútbol Argentino) together with the A.Pre.Vi.De (Agencia Prevención Violencia en el Deporte) decided to implement a drastic measure in order to limit violence. This took the form of a ban forbidding the presence of visiting team

0.504 points more than visiting teams. Without crowds they received only 0.278 points more. Finally, Reade et al. (2022) considered 160 games played without supporters in 7 different European leagues since 2002 and find that home teams won 10% less than in games with fans.

[6] We replicated our analysis for the season 2021, comparing games played with some home supporters in the stadium and games played without supporters in the stadium. Results in table J.1 are not significant due to the lack of power but suggest that the probability of losing for the visiting team is lower with empty stadiums than when home supporters are in the stadium.

[7] This tragedy, known as *"Tragedia de la puerta 12"*, was originated by a locked exit: the pressure caused by the mass of Boca Juniors supporters trying to exit caused the death of seventy one supporters.

supporters during first division games. It was immediately effective until the end of the 2012/2013 season and it was subsequently extended for the following seasons (Act: 4810, 20 August, 2013). Only home team supporters could enter the stadium while the visitors stand had to remain empty.

In 2015, the government occasionally lifted the ban for some selected games as a pilot experiment. The ban is still in place to date (Dec. 2022), but since 2015, besides the non-random temporary lifting of the ban in different forms, and besides Covid-19, there were also a series of non-random structural changes in the organization of the first division of the Argentinean football. All the changes that occurred since 2015 were non-random and most likely were the outcome of political negotiations among the first division clubs. For these reasons, the only clean setting for identification purposes took place between June 2013 and December 2014, which is the period that we cover in this paper. Adding games played after December 2014 would pollute our identification.[8]

2.2 Data

To assess the impact of the ban on visitor teams performance, we collected data from the Argentinean first division games played between August 2011 and December 2014.[9] Our primary source of data is the popular football website transfermarkt.com.[10] Transfermarkt contains scores, results and rankings of numerous leagues globally, as well as information on companies, players' careers and transfers. As shown by Peeters (2018), Bryson et al. (2013) and Frick & Prinz (2006), estimated players' values are extremely accurate and take into account salaries, signing fees, bonuses, and transfer fees (Franck & Nüesch 2012).

Our main dataset contains information on 25 teams and 1,330 games: 380 games for each of the first three seasons (2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014) and 190 games for the 2014 season.[11] Using the exact date of each game we divided the sample into 591 "treated" games played after the implementation of the ban and 739 "control" games played before the ban. For each game we consider the final result, the number of goals scored by each team, the number of yellow and red cards given to players of each team and penalties conceded.[12] We observe team lineup at each game including information on all the players

[8]See Appendix A.2 for a summary of the most salient changes that occurred after December 2014.

[9]We do not have enough information on games played before 2011.

[10]In April 2020 transfermarkt.de was the second largest portal with a focus on football in Germany.

[11]In the first three seasons, each team played every other team twice, whereas in the 2014 season called *"Torneo Transición"* each team played every other team once.

[12]In addition, we collected data on total shots, corners, faults and ball possession. Unfortunately, this information is available only for less than one third of the control group games, so we could not use these data

that were on the game roster. Further, we retrieve information on the entire squad value at the beginning of each season.[13]

In addition, we also scraped data on the national cup (*Copa Argentina*) games that were played in the same period of the study.[14] The ban did not apply to the *Copa Argentina* games, which makes these games an informative counterfactual group. However, this additional dataset contains only 161 games and the teams are often not the same as those playing in the main league. This limitation makes the sample not suitable for a robust difference in difference specification. Therefore, we only use these data as a robustness check. For the *Copa Argentina* games we are able to record only the final results.

Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables used for the main analysis. For each variable, the table reports its mean and standard deviation, before and after the ban. The last row shows the number of games in our database. Notice that visiting teams are more likely to loose than home teams, both before and after the ban. This is the so-called "home advantage". What is key to this paper is that the probability of losing for a visiting team is higher after the ban. Indeed, visiting teams are more likely to lose, less likely to draw and, to a lower extent, less likely to win after the ban. Appendix Figure B.1 contains a graphical representation of change in the probability of losing for the visiting team. It plots the portion of games ended with a defeat of the visiting team in the 59 turns (match day) played before and after the ban. In addition, it shows the linear fit using all the observations before and another using the after ban games. From the figure, it is clear that (a) there is a clear jump in the share of games lost by the visiting team after the introduction of the ban to visiting team supporters and (b) there is no upward or downward trend in the outcome variable.[15] The score differences in favor of home teams also increases, resulting mainly as a consequence of the number of goals conceded to visiting teams. The table also shows that, in line with "home advantage", referees are more likely to award more penalties to home teams and to give more red and yellow cards to visiting teams. It is important to note that this figure only slightly changes with the ban.

Panel B refers instead to the national cup games that we use in our counterfactual analysis. In this case both the fraction of visiting teams losing and winning increased after the

for the analysis.

[13]The Argentinean football association (AFA) states two windows for players' transfers between teams per year, usually before the beginning of the seasons and corresponding to the end of the first half. Most of the transfers happens between two seasons. Market values are available for only half of the total number of players in the database.

[14]To collect these data we use the website *mismarcadores.es*.

[15]For completeness, Appendix Table B.1 presents raw averages of the games ended with a defeat for the visiting team, by season, for both League and Copa games.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Before		After	
	Mean (1)	SD (2)	Mean (3)	SD (4)
Panel A: League Games				
Visiting team losing (share)	0.403	0.491	0.462	0.499
Visiting team winning (share)	0.262	0.440	0.250	0.433
Draws (share)	0.336	0.473	0.288	0.453
Score difference (HT-VT)	0.270	1.459	0.393	1.524
Goals scored by Home Team	1.232	1.117	1.337	1.146
Goals scored by Visiting Team	0.962	0.986	0.944	1.005
Red Cards to Home Team	0.173	0.420	0.141	0.394
Red Cards to Visiting Team	0.251	0.519	0.222	0.537
Yellow cards to Home Team	2.350	1.335	2.215	1.349
Yellow cards to Visiting Team	2.797	1.432	2.666	1.324
Number of penalties awarded Home Team	0.107	0.326	0.141	0.376
Number of penalties awarded Visiting Team	0.067	0.239	0.080	0.271
Number of games	739		591	
Panel B: Cup Games				
Visiting team losing (share)	.453	.500	.491	.504
Visiting team winning (share)	.424	.497	.509	.504
Draws (share)	.123	.329	0.000	0.000
Number of games	106		55	

This table reports the summary statistics of the dataset we use for the main analysis (league games) in Panel A and for the counterfactual analysis (cup games) in Panel B. Columns (1) and (3) report the average values before and after the ban, and Columns (2) and (4) report the standard deviations. "Visiting team losing (share)" refers to the proportion of games that ended with a victory for the home team. "Visiting team winning (share)" refers to the proportion of games that ended with a victory for the visiting team. "Draws (share)" refers to the proportion of games that ended with a draw. "HT-VT" refers to the difference between the goals scored by the home team (HT) and the goals scored by the visiting team (VT).

ban. Contrary to what happens in league games, the net change is in favor of the local team rather than the visiting team.

3 Impact Estimates

3.1 Empirical Model

The aim of this study is to identify the effect on team performance of switching from playing a football game as the visiting team in a stadium with both home and visiting team supporters versus playing a football game as the visiting team in a stadium with only home team supporters. The latent variable is the overall performance of visiting teams. As a proxy for team performance we use the result of the game and the score difference, calculated as the difference between the number of goals scored by the home team and the goals scored by the visiting team. We estimate two models: a Linear Probability model, where the dependent variable indicates games ended with the visiting team losing, and an Ordered Logit model for the score difference. In both specifications, the dependent variable is regressed on team and game fixed effects and on a dummy variable indicating whether the game was played with or without supporters. Our main specification is as follows:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta L_{it} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

Where y_{it} is a dummy which takes value 1 if the visiting team lost the game, or match, i that was played in week t; α is a constant, and L_{it} is a dummy taking value 1 when the ban is in force.[16] The variable γ_i indicates time-invariant unobserved components related to the intrinsic characteristics of the teams or the games: we estimate different specifications including: (i) home team fixed effects, (ii) visiting team fixed effects, (iii) home and visiting team fixed effects and (iv) match fixed effects. In this way we assure that any significant estimated effect for the coefficient of interest (β) is not driven by specific team pairs. To control for potential autocorrelation of the error terms we cluster standard errors at team and match level.[17]

[16]Note that match i means that a given team is playing at home while another given team is playing as visitor. If the same two teams play at the visitor stadium instead of the host team stadium, the match is classified as a different one. The time index t ranges from 1 to 133, since there are 7 (half) seasons in our database and in each seasons there are 19 turns.

[17]The number of teams is lower than the rule of thumb minimum number of clusters indicated by Cameron & Miller (2015), however our identification does not seem to suffer from this. When we cluster for match, we have 550 clusters. This number is lower than 25x25 because not all seasons include the same teams, implying that some teams never play with some others.

Our empirical model essentially compares the results of the games in the Argentinean first league played before the ban to results of games played after the ban was introduced. The identification assumption relies on the non existence of other forces that could affect the result of the games and appear contemporaneously with the ban or in the period just after. In other words, we assume that the expected result of every game played before the day in which the law took effect and after that day would be the same if the ban would have never been implemented.

In addition to including season and round fixed effects to control for heterogeneity within a season and round and also to controlling for different time trends, in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we perform two additional analyses to sharpen our identification. We first conduct a counterfactual test using the games from the national cup tournament (*Copa Argentina*) instead of the league games. The national cup is played every year by teams from first and lower divisions of the AFA, and it fits as a counterfactual experiment since the ban for visiting team supporters does not apply to the cup, plus the games were played contemporaneously to the first division league. Second, we replicate the main analysis dropping the games played by teams that were promoted or relegated in 2013, and those played by teams that did not participate in all the four seasons.

3.2 Main Result: Effect on Team Performance

Table 2 reports the coefficients of estimating eq. (1) with OLS for alternative specifications. The specification in Column (1) shows estimates without any control variables. The probability that the visiting team loses a game in the period in which the law is in effect is, on average, 6.3 percentage points greater than before, equivalent to an increase of 15.64%. Columns (2) to (4) reports OLS estimates of eq. (1) with standard errors clustered by team (visiting or home) and by game, respectively. The main result holds for these different specifications. In the remaining columns we add home team fixed effects (Column 5), visiting team fixed effects (Column 6), both (Column 7) and game fixed effects (Column 8). In these last four specifications, the size of the coefficient of interest only increases.

Our preferred specification is reported in Column (6), where we control for visiting team fixed effects, because all the unobservable time invariant components related only to the visiting team are taking into account. In this specification, the ban increases the probability of losing a game for the visiting team by 21.6% (0.18 standard deviation increase).

Appendix Table C.1 shows that these results are robust to using a Logit model. Table C.2 replicates the analysis using twoway clustered standard errors, where indicators for the

Table 2: Effects of the Ban on the Probability of Losing as a Visitor

OLS Estimation								
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.059^{**}	0.059^{**}	0.059^{*}	0.059^{**}	0.046^{*}	0.087^{***}	0.075^{**}	0.081^{*}
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

home and the visiting team represent the two cluster dimensions. The table shows that results remain stable. Tables D.1, D.2 and D.3 show that results remain stable to the inclusion of turn (time) linear, quadratic and cubic trends, respectively. The magnitude of the effect is consistent with the main result reported above and it is constant in time. Since there are only 190 binary observations in each half-season bin, standard errors are larger. Finally, to alleviate any possible remaining concerns regarding potential trends, following Goodman-Bacon (2021), we estimate a pre-trend based on the data before the ban, compute the residuals and re-estimate the baseline model on these residuals. Results of the first and second stage of this analysis are presented in Appendix Table D.4. As can be observed, our results are robust to this approach.

For completeness, we estimate the event study version of the previous model.[18] The accident that generated the ban happened toward the end of the *2012/2013 Clausura* season. Therefore, we use that half season as reference and estimate six coefficients representing the change in the probability of losing for the visiting team in the three half seasons before

[18] In particular, we estimate the coefficients of the following model: $y_{ikt} = \alpha + \sum_{m=1\setminus 4}^{7} \beta_m D_{k=m} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{ikt}$. Where y_{ikt} is a dummy which takes value 1 if the visiting team lost the game i that was played in the half season k and week t; k ranges from 1 to 7 since there are 7 half seasons in our database. $D_{k=m}$ is a dummy taking value 1 if the game is played in season m. As above, α is a constant and γ_i indicates time-invariant unobserved components related to the intrinsic characteristics of the teams or the games.

and in the three half seasons after the *2012/2013 Clausura* one. We report these estimates in Figure 1. As expected, the figure shows no significant differences in the probability of losing among the four half-seasons before the ban, while highlight a significant increase in this probability in the two subsequent half-seasons. The result for the half-season 2014 is not significant but in terms of magnitude is in line with the previous two.

Figure 1: Event Study Coefficients



This figure plots OLS estimation coefficients of the effect of the half-season dummies on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. The *2012-2013 clausura* half season dummy is taken as reference point and is omitted from the regression. Controls include dummies for visiting team. Standard errors are clustered by local and visiting team.

In addition, we study the effect of the ban on another proxy of relative team performance: the difference between the number of goals scored by the home team and the number of goals scored by the visiting team. We refer to this measure as "score difference". The specification that we use is the same as that described in eq. (1). As dependent variable we use the score difference instead of a dummy for the visiting team losing. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients of an Ordered Logit model on the effect of the ban on the score difference. As before, our preferred specification is in Column (6) where dummies for the visiting team are included and standard errors are clustered at visiting team level. As it is evident from the table, we find that the odds that the visiting team concedes an additional goal more than the opponent are 1.3 times greater after the ban.

Table 3: Effects of the Ban on the Score Difference

Maximum Likelihood Estimation								
Dependent Variable: *Goals Difference in the final result*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	1.184*	1.184*	1.184*	1.184*	1.165	1.302**	1.292**	1.371*
	(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.136)	(0.154)	(0.229)
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

Maximum Likelihood estimation of an Ordered Logit Model of the effect of the ban on the goals difference. Goals difference is computed by subtracting the number of goals scored by the visiting team from the number of goals scored by the home team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7) and dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

In the Appendix (Table E.1) we study the effect of the ban on the absolute number of goals scored by each team separately. We find that the ban significantly increases the number of goals scored by home teams (Panel A - col. 6), but does not affect the number of goals scored by visiting teams (Panel B - col. 6). This implies that the observed score difference is due to the home teams scoring more rather than the visiting teams scoring less.

3.3 Counterfactual Experiment

The ideal counterfactual group for our empirical analysis would be one in which the same teams play contemporaneously to the period we use for the analysis but in a context in which the ban is not in effect. Fortunately, the Argentine case provides a setting that is close to this ideal. We exploit the fact that the AFA did not implement the ban for games played in the contemporaneous tournament, *Copa Argentina*.[19] This constitutes a valid counterfactual, as these are games played in the same time period as those of the League, by most of the teams of the League but with the visiting supporters being allowed to enter the stadiums. To test whether the ban had an effect on the probability of losing a game as a visiting team, we estimate eq. (1) using games played for the *Copa Argentina* instead of games played in the League.

[19] The *Copa Argentina* started in 2011, although two other editions were played in 1969 and 1970.

Table 4 presents the results of this counterfactual experiment. The main coefficient is never statistically significant, and in the first four columns, without fixed effects, it is also small in magnitude. Only for consistency with previous tables, we include regressions with team and match fixed effects (columns (5)-(7)). However, these coefficients are not well identified due to the low number of games played in the national cup and to the variability in the teams: each team appears on average 2.78 times in the sample and only 29 teams played at least a game before and after the ban. While, as previously mentioned, this limitation makes the Cup Games sample not suitable for a robust difference in difference estimation, it does provide a close to ideal counterfactual.[20]

Table 4: Counterfactual Test: Main Regression Specifications with Cup Games

OLS Estimation							
Dependent Variable: *=1 if Visiting team loses*							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Presence of the Ban	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	-0.038	0.123	0.202
	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.112)	(0.135)	(0.254)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓
N	161	161	161	161	161	161	161
Number of Clusters		58	74	160	58	74	160
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓		
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓	
Cluster Match				✓			✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Sample: all games of the *Copa Argentina* between August 2011 and December 2015. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7) and dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

3.4 Excluding Promoted, Relegated Teams, Lanús and Estudiantes

The implementation of the ban started two weeks before the end of 2012/2013 season and the beginning of 2013/2014 season. As mentioned in Section 2.2, there were no changes in the league structure or in the rules from one season to another. However, three teams,

[20]For completeness, we also estimate an event study model for the *Copa Argentina* and report estimated coefficients in the Appendix Figure E.1. Coefficients are never significantly different from 0; there is a not significant increase in the probability of losing for the visiting team in 2014 but this happens more than one year after the introduction of the ban.

Independiente, Union de Santa Fé and San Martín de Tucumán, got relegated to the second division while three other teams, *Olimpo de Bahía Blanca, GELP and Rosario Central*, were promoted to the first division. These two groups of teams may differ in ways that are correlated with our dependent variable. Indeed, they do differ in the geographical position of their stadium and the average number of visiting supporters. To account for this concern, on top of including team fixed effects, we run as a robustness check the main specification excluding all games played by these six teams. As shown in Table F.1, our main results remain robust to this restriction.

As an additional robustness check, we perform the same analysis excluding all teams that were promoted or relegated at least once in the study time span, restricting the sample to the twelve teams that participated in all the seasons.[21] Again, as Table F.2 shows, our results are not sensitive to this sample selction.

Finally, we account for potential bias in the results coming from the team that were the cause for the ban, we replicated the main result excluding the games played by *Lanús* and *Estudiantes*. We report results in Tables F.3 and F.4 and show that the main results are also robust to this exercise.

4 Mechanisms

In this section, we consider alternative channels, other than moral support, through which the ban could potentially affect visiting team performance. In particular, we study the effect of the ban on referee hostility, manager strategy and player value. We finish this section by studying differential effects of the ban for big and small clubs.

4.1 Does the Ban Affect Referees' Behavior?

Lack of supporters could in principle affect the performance of visiting teams by increasing referee hostility towards them. There is evidence showing that referees can bias their decisions due to supporters pressure (Sutter & Kocher (2004); Garicano et al. (2005)). The lack of visiting supporters might alleviate that pressure and increase referee hostility towards visiting teams. In this subsection, we investigate whether such mechanism is at work in our setting.

Referees can influence the result of a game by awarding penalties or giving yellow and

[21] The teams in the restricted sample are: *Arsenal Sarandi, Atletico Rafaela, Belgrano, Boca Juniors, Estudiantes, Godoy Cruz, Lanus, Newell's, Racing Club, San Lorenzo, Tigre, Velez.*

red cards[22] to players in an unfair way Boyko et al. (2007).[23] We test whether the ban increased the hostility of referees towards visiting teams by estimating eq. (1) using as outcome variables the number of yellow and red cards given to players as well as the number of penalties inflicted on home and visiting teams.

Results of OLS estimations are presented in Table 5: Panel A shows the effect of the ban on yellow cards, Panel B on red cards, and Panel C on penalties. We observe no significant effect of the ban on cards. Some specifications point toward a significant reduction of yellow cards awarded to both home and visiting teams after the ban. These effects go always in the same direction for both teams and are very similar in terms of magnitude and are never significantly different from each other. Regarding penalties, we observe some slight increase in the penalties awarded to home, but also to visiting teams after the ban. A t-test reveals that the increase of penalties awarded to home teams is not significantly different from the increase of penalties awarded to visiting teams (with p-values ranging from 0.525 to 0.533, depending on the specification).[24]

We further replicate the main analysis controlling for yellow and red cards awarded to each team in Table G.1, penalties awarded to each team in table G.2, and both in Table G.3. All results remain significant. The magnitude of the effect decreases by very little, signaling that a tiny portion (1% to 5%) of the total effect that we identify might be due to changes in referee behavior. All in all, the analysis suggests that there is no strong evidence of a change in referee hostility towards one of the two teams. Hence, we conclude that the reduction in visiting team performance cannot be attributed to this a priori plausible mechanism.

4.2 Does the Ban Change the Strategy of Managers?

Another potential confounding factor that could be affected by the presence of the ban regards the strategy of managers. In principle, managers could internalize that without the support when playing away they would be more likely to loose and adapt their strategy accordingly. In addition, since the ban does not apply to non-league games, managers could decide to change the distribution of energy between home games and away games when playing in the league or in the cup, and this could be a potential confounding factor

[22]A yellow card allows the player to stay in the game. With two yellow cards (or one red card) the player is immediately expelled from the game.

[23]Sutter & Kocher (2004) and Garicano et al. (2005) show that referees can also favor home teams by adding extra time to disproportionately benefit the home team. Unfortunately, we could not find data on extra time for the Argentine League during the period of our study.

[24]The effects are even closer in terms of magnitude if we observe the real size of the effect, in percentage, dividing each coefficient by the corresponding baseline level from Table 1.

Table 5: Effect of the ban on Referees Decisions

	OLS Estimation							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Yellow Cards								
Dependent Variable: *Number of yellow cards shown to home team players*								
Presence of the Ban	-0.134*	-0.134	-0.134*	-0.134*	-0.139	-0.128	-0.134	-0.160
	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.111)
Dependent Variable: *Number of yellow cards shown to visiting team players*								
Presence of the Ban	-0.131*	-0.131	-0.131	-0.131*	-0.169*	-0.082	-0.121	-0.077
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.095)	(0.076)	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.118)
Panel B: Red Cards								
Dependent Variable: *Number of red cards shown to home team players*								
Presence of the Ban	-0.033	-0.033	-0.033	-0.033	-0.035	-0.037	-0.038	-0.043
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.034)
Dependent Variable: *Number of red cards shown to visiting team players*								
Presence of the Ban	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	-0.026	-0.009	-0.006	-0.022
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.042)
Panel C: Penalties Awarded								
Dependent Variable: *Number of penalties awarded - home team*								
Presence of the Ban	0.034*	0.034	0.034	0.034*	0.033	0.035	0.034	0.028
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Dependent Variable: *Number of penalties awarded - visiting team*								
Presence of the Ban	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.017	0.019	0.017	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Controls								
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

Panel A: OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the number of yellow cards shown to home/visiting team players. Panel B: OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the number of red cards shown to home/visiting team players. Panel C: OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of having a penalty awarded to the home/visiting team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

threatening identification.

In order to test this potential mechanism, we perform two set of analyses. First, we include different sets of time controls. We estimate our main specification with half-season fixed effects (apertura/clausura) and turn/week fixed effects (from 1 to 19). In this way every single turn/week within a season is compared to the correspondent turn/week in other seasons. We also estimate eq. (1) adding month fixed effects (from 1 to 12) to compare all games played in a particular month of the year. Tables H.1 and H.2 report results of this analysis. All the coefficients of interest remain significant. The magnitude of the effect is approximately the same as in the basic model of Table 2 for the first specification while it increases by 1 percent in the second model. These results rule out any potential change of visiting teams performance that could happen due to time, other than the ban.

Second, we test whether there is a difference between home and away lineups of the same team and how this changed after the ban, irrespective of the market value. We define the team's lineup of a game as the set of the eleven starting players. We do a bilateral comparison of each team's lineup with every other lineup of the same team within a half-season.[25] For each lineup-pair we compute the Jaccard similarity index (Jaccard 1908), which is defined as the quotient of the intersection between two sets divided by their union. The index takes values between zero (completely different lineups) and one (identical lineups). After making every within-team bilateral comparison of lineups for each half-season, we end up with 38 Jaccard indexes per game, 19 for the home team and 19 for the visiting team, for a total of 7.600 indexes per half-season.[26] Since each lineup can refer to either a home or an away game, we have four types of lineup-pairs: (i) home-home, (ii) home-visiting, (iii) visiting-home and (iv) visiting-visiting. We then average all the indexes in each of the four groups and test whether there are differences between these four statistics and whether these differences change with the ban.

Figure 2 shows the averages Jaccard indexes for home team (Panel A) and visiting team (Panel B) lineups for each half season. The blue dots refer to similarity with the other home games and the red dots to similarity with the away games. We do not find any significant difference in the similarity index between home and visiting lineups. We find, instead, that each home game lineup is slightly more similar to the lineups of the other games when the team plays visiting than the ones of the other home games. A mirrored pattern arises

[25]We consider the half season horizon to have a quite homogeneous squad, since player market sessions happen between each half season.

[26]Note that each team plays 19 games in each half-season, therefore we have 19 lineup-pairs per team per game. Since there are 2 teams for each game, we end up computing 38 Jaccard's indexes per game. Given that there are 190 games in one half-season, in total we have 38*190=7.600 indexes per half-season.

Figure 2: Jaccard Similarity Index

Panel A: lineups of home teams

Panel B: lineups of visiting teams



This figure shows the average lineup Jaccard similarity index for home team (Panel A) and visiting team (Panel B) by half-season. The sample includes 1309 games for which Transfermarkt reports exactly eleven starting players for each team.

when observing the lineups when the team plays away. This is not surprising if we take into account that there is usually an alternation between home games and games as visiting, making all home games closer in time to the visiting games than the home games and vice-versa. More importantly for the main goal of the analysis, we do not find any sign of changes in the similarity structure after the ban. If managers changed their strategy after the ban by choosing different players for home and away games, we would observe an inverse position of the blue and the red dot after the 2012/2013 season, which is clearly not the case.

We also use the Jaccard similarity index as a control in our main eq. 1 to study a) whether our main results hold and b) whether changes on team lineups impact the likelihood that a visiting team loses a game. Table H.3 reports results of the estimation for the eight specifications. The set of control variables includes all possible combinations of the Jaccard index between home (visiting) teams and home (visiting) games. The number of observations decreased to 1309 games as the starting lineup of 11 players was not available for 21 games. As expected, our main result is robust to this new specification. Given the similarity in the Jaccard index between the lineups for home and visiting games reported in Figure 2 and considering the results of the regressions reported in Table H.3, we conclude that managers did not react to the ban by strategically modifying player lineups when playing home or away.

4.3 DOES THE BAN AFFECT THE MARKET VALUE OF TEAMS?

The presence of the ban could potentially affect the market value of teams. For instance, teams may be motivated to sell some of their top players to foreign leagues as a way to compensate for the reduction in the seasonal income due to the lack of visiting supporters at the stadium. This would imply an average decrease in the market value of teams between the end of 2012/13 season and the beginning of 2013/14 season with potential consequences on team performance. To test for this potential channel, we analyze player monetary value using data from Transfermarkt.[27] Transfermarkt estimates the value of most (professional) football players in the world and constantly updates the database taking into account salaries, bonuses and transfer fees.[28]

Figure 3 shows the evolution of the average player market value by season. In the left panel we represent the average value of all teams playing in the first division while in the right panel we separate the analysis between the *Big-5* clubs, reported in red and all the teams together, reported in blue.[29]

Figure 3: Average Player Values by Season

Panel A: All teams Panel B: Big 5 versus the rest



This Figure shows the average value of all players playing in the First Argentinean League by season. Note: The sample includes all the 820 players reported in the Transfermarkt database with a player value greater than 0.

[27] The market value is available only for selected players, we consider all players with a market value above 0 resulting in a sample of 820 players, an average of 32.8 players per team. When we observe the same player in a different team we treat that individual as a distinct player. Appendix Tables K.2 and K.3 report the number of players with a market value and the average market value by sample and season. While the number of reported players' values constantly increased in time, the average squad value did not change.

[28] These data are used in the literature as a proxy for team market value. Krumer & Lechner (2018), Bryson et al. (2013) and Franck & Nüesch (2012) compared Transfermarkt data with the most famous local sport magazine in Germany, Kicker, finding a correlation of 0.89.

[29] *Big-5* clubs are the five biggest clubs in Argentina. See Section 5 for more details.

We divide the teams into two groups because, if there is an effect on market value, we believe that it should be more salient for bigger teams, which have more top-value players. In the left panel, we observe that the average value of players does not change substantially between seasons when considering all the teams in the analysis, ruling out any possibility of *fire-sell* due to the loss of income after the ban. In the right panel, not surprisingly, we observe that the average market value for the *Big-5* is, for each season, much higher compared to the average of all teams together. Interestingly, the presence of the ban does not have a negative effect on the market value of the *Big-5* which keeps following a slightly increasing trend toward all the seasons.

Even if the total value of the team remains constant, the value of the lineups could change between games depending on which players the manager chooses. Following the same argument in Section 4.2, managers could decide strategically to play with better players (i.e., more valuable) in home games, given the presence of team supporters while not employing the most valuable players in the starting lineup when playing away.[30] Figure 4 reports the average player market value for the 7 half-seasons separately for home (in blue) and away (in red) games. The vertical dotted line represents the introduction of the ban occurring between the end of the 2012/2013 season and the beginning of the 2013/2014 season. Despite a mild, not significant, increase in the lineups value in the first three seasons, we do not record any change between the last pre-ban season and the following ones. As expected, there are no differences between the value of the teams for home versus away games and no change after the ban.

As in the previous section, we replicate the main estimation, controlling for the average seasonal market value of home and visiting teams. As shown in Table H.4, in all the specifications, the coefficients for the market value of home teams are positive and statistically significant, implying an increase in the probability that a visiting team will lose if the market value of the home team increases. The opposite occurs when the market value of the visiting team increases given that the probability that the visiting team will lose decreases significantly. Since, as shown above, the team value does not change between seasons, controlling for team fixed effect makes these coefficients not significant. In all specifications, our main coefficient of interest remains positive and significant after controlling for team value. Thus, we can conclude that the negative effect of the ban on visiting team performance is not due to changes in team market value.

[30] For this analysis the sample is restricted to the 467 players that played at least one game in the starting 11.

Figure 4: Average Player Values by Half-Season



This Figure shows the average value of all players playing in the Argentine First League by half-season. The sample includes all the 467 players reported in the Transfermarkt database with a player value greater than 0 that played at least one game in the starting eleven.

4.4 Does the Ban Affect the Revenues of the Visiting Teams?

A potential alternative mechanism behind our results could be that visiting teams perform worse after the ban because their revenues are cut as their supporters could not buy tickets when they play away. While we do not have data on revenues, the way the Argentine football is organized makes this alternative mechanism implausible. All revenues from the sale of tickets of a game are accrued by the host team, and the costs to organize the game are also paid exclusively by the host team. The guest teams do not get any revenue from the tickets bought by their supporters when they play away.

5 Heterogeneous Treatment Effect

In this section, we analyse whether the lack of moral support is more consequential for bigger or smaller clubs. A priori, it is not clear what to expect. While bigger clubs may be more affected by the ban because they have more supporters, they also have more monetary resources and hence may rely less on the moral support of their fans. Smaller clubs, instead, may rely more on their supporters to compensate for the lack of monetary resources.

To answer this question, we leverage that the Argentinean football league has a recognized clear distinction between the five biggest clubs, and the rest. The biggest clubs, called "*the Big 5*" (los cinco grandes), are Boca Juniors, River Plate, San Lorenzo, Racing Club and Independiente. These clubs have, by far, the largest number of supporters, the highest number of members, the highest number of followers in social media. They manage the biggest budgets and have won the most national and international cups (*AFA| FIFA - Informe Clubes Fútbol* 2019).[31] We refer to all the other teams that are not in the *Big 5* circle as *small* clubs.

To test whether the ban affected the *Big 5* clubs more than the smaller clubs, we augment the model in eq. (1) by binary variables for home and visiting team being a *Big 5* and interactions with the ban indicator.

$$
\begin{aligned}
y_{it} = \alpha + \beta L_{it} + \delta_1 B5H_i + \delta_2 B5V_i + \delta_3 B5H_i \times B5V_i \\
+ \psi_1 L_{it} \times B5H_i + \psi_2 L_{it} \times B5V_i + \psi_3 L_{it} \times B5H_i \times B5V_i + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{it}
\end{aligned}
\tag{2}
$$

Where y_{it}, L_{it} and γ_i are the indicators for the visiting team losing, the ban and the game time invariant controls, respectively, as described in eq. (1). $B5H_i$ and $B5V_i$ are binary variables for home (H) and visiting (V) team being a *Big 5*.

Table 6 reports results of this analysis for all the specifications, while Appendix Figure I.1 reports a graphical representation of the estimated coefficients for our preferred specification, column 6 of the aforementioned table. The coefficients for *Big 5* (δ_1, δ_2 and δ_3) are not statistically significant, which implies that before the ban, big and small clubs are equally likely to lose when playing away. Consistently with the result observed in Table 2, β is always significant and positive, indicating that, after the ban, small clubs are more likely to lose when playing away against other small clubs. The effect does not change if they play away against a *Big 5* - the coefficient ψ_1 is often close to 0 and never significant. When a *Big 5* plays away the situations is different. The coefficient ψ_2 estimates the effect of the ban on losing when a *Big 5* visitor plays against a small club. It is negative and always significant, highlighting a positive differential effect of the ban for big clubs. This offsets the positive effect observed for small clubs, suggesting that the *Big 5* do not gain from the ban when playing at small clubs' stadiums.[32] Conversely, even if not always significant, the coefficient of the triple interaction (ψ_3) is positive and quantitatively important. While the ban does not seem to affect big clubs when they play away against small clubs, it has a

[31] For further information on the Big-5 clubs see also: http://www.thebubble.com/who-are-argentinas-big-five-football-clubs/.

[32] The effect of the ban on losing when playing away against small teams for big teams is estimated by $\beta + \delta$, and it is not significant.

Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects: The *Big-5*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
OLS Estimation							
Dependent Variable: *=1 if Visiting team loses*							
Presence of the Ban	0.071^{**}	0.071^{**}	0.071^{*}	0.071^{**}	0.059^{*}	0.105^{**}	0.094^{**}
	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Visiting team big 5	-0.037	-0.037	-0.037	-0.037	-0.037		
	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.033)		
Home team big 5	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060		0.063	
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.050)		(0.061)	
Visiting team big 5 * Ban	-0.120^{*}	-0.120^{**}	-0.120^{**}	-0.120^{*}	-0.121^{**}	-0.129^{**}	-0.129^{*}
	(0.071)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.074)
Home team big 5 * Ban	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.016	0.019	0.008
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.064)	(0.087)	(0.082)
Visiting big 5 * Home big 5	-0.036	-0.036	-0.036	-0.036	-0.040	-0.039	-0.043
	(0.109)	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.096)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.094)
Visiting big 5 * Home big 5 * Ban	0.200	0.200^{**}	0.200	0.200	0.210^{**}	0.200	0.209
	(0.166)	(0.087)	(0.119)	(0.157)	(0.087)	(0.118)	(0.162)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓		
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓	
Cluster Match				✓			✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team interacting the effect with (i) the home team being among the best five teams in the league, (ii) the visiting team being among the best five teams in the league and (ii) both teams being among the best five teams in the league. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7) and dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

strong effect on them when playing at other *Big 5* stadiums, dramatically increasing their probability of losing against a direct rival.

These results suggest that moral support is relevant, and often pivotal, when there is a balance of power between the two clubs. Moral support seems to compensate the power of monetary resources. When a *Big 5* visits a small club, the fan support is marginal. However, when a small club visits another small club, or a *Big 5* club visits another *Big 5*, without accompanying supporters, material resources are equalized, so moral support kicks in as an important non-material resource. When a small club visits a *Big 5*, its resources are lower than those of the opponent. In this case moral support also plays a role.

6 Concluding Remarks

To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical evidence regarding the effect of moral support on performance in a natural competitive environment. Identification relies on an unusual change in Argentinean football legislation, which prohibits visiting supporters from accompanying their teams on away games. We find that, without the support of their fans, visiting teams are 20% more likely to lose. This result is robust to a set of alternative specifications. In addition, we find no evidence of a change in referee decisions due to the ban, suggesting that the effect on team performance is not due to a change in referee hostility. As a counterfactual test, we run the analysis using contemporaneous cup games, where the visiting team supporters were allowed to attend. We find no effect of the ban on the cup games, which provides additional empirical support to our findings. Finally, we find that moral support is more relevant, and often pivotal, when there is a balance of power between the two teams, suggesting that moral support compensates for the power of monetary resources.

These findings are novel, and as such, they open new avenues for future research on the effect of moral support on behavior in general, and on individual and team performance in particular. Moral support plays a key motivational role even in a highly competitive setting, with high monetary incentives. We expect that moral support will be even more consequential in settings with lower monetary incentives in which the degree of substitution between the two forms of compensation (monetary and moral) should be higher. The research topic is only nascent. Laboratory and field experiments can be designed to study whether the effect of moral support varies with the context, with the degree of competitiveness of the environment, with the way moral support is provided or with who provides it. It would also be interesting to study gender differences on the effect of moral support on performance, and whether the effect is different depending on whether the subject of support is an individual or a team. Finally, it is possible to test whether the effects we find in the Argentinean football context can be replicated in other contexts, by using other sources of naturally occurring exogenous shocks on moral support, such us weather conditions or transport strikes.

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APPENDIX

A CONTEXT

A.1 VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINEAN FOOTBALL

Figure A.1: Deaths from Violence in Argentinean Football

This Figure shows the number of deaths due to episodes of violence in stadiums during professional football games in Argentina. The database was constructed based on the information provided by the NGO "Salvemos el fútbol" and published by the newspaper "La Nación".

Figure A.1 shows data from all deaths from violence in Argentinean football, including the deaths of supporters of teams from lower divisions. During the period of this study (from 2011 to 2014), there were 49 deaths, 28 of supporters from first division teams, and 21 from lower division teams. Out of the 28 deaths from first division team supporters, 23 of them occurred in episodes orthogonal to any game (in different venues and times), and most deaths (20) were caused by clashes between supporters of the same team due to internal conflicts. Most deaths were *not* caused by clashes between host and visiting supporters on a match day and venue. Finally, from the beginning of 2011 until the ban was implemented on 10 June 2013, there were 17 deaths of supporters from first division teams, and from 10 June 2013 until th end of 2014, there were 11 deaths of supporters from first division teams. While the number of deaths continued to be high, the trend after the ban did not increase, and if anything, decreased. One reason we conjecture that can explain the high remaining level of deaths after the ban could be that the great majority of the deaths did not happen during the games and are not due to clashes between two different teams' supporters. Finally, it is important to note that no first division football player was directly threatened, injured, or killed in any of these violent episodes in Argentinean football.

A.2 NON-RANDOM CHANGES OF ARGENTINE FOOTBALL ORGANIZATION SINCE 2015

In this Appendix we enumerate the most salient changes that occurred in the organization of the Argentinean football from January 2015 to date. We first describe the structure of the tournament of the first division during the period of analysis of this paper, and then introduce the changes chronologically.

STRUCTURE OF THE TOURNAMENT DURING 2011-2014

During the period of analysis of this paper (2011-2014), there were two tournaments in each season following the European calendar: the Apertura tournament played in the second half of the calendar year, and the Clausura tournament played in the first half of the following year. There were 20 teams per season. At the end of the season, the two teams with the worst average in the relegation table (average points scored in the last four seasons) were relegated and replaced by the two best teams from the second division tournament. This structure was kept throughout the period of analysis of this paper. However, from 2015 onward, there were several major changes in the organization of the tournament that make it impossible to use the data from 2015 onward for a sensible econometric analysis (For detailed information, see here).

CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE TOURNAMENT SINCE 2015

Table A.1 presents the structure of the seasons from 2011 to 2021, with the number of teams participating, number of teams relegated, number of teams promoted, and an indication of whether visiting and/or home supporters were allowed in stadiums. As it can be seen, the structure of the seasons starting in 2015 is significantly different from structure of the seasons 2011-2014.

First, in the 2015 season, there was a massive promotion of ten teams. There was also a single tournament during the whole calendar year (instead of Apertura and Clausura), with thirty teams in one round. Each team played against 16 teams only, and the roster was not randomly chosen. In the first part of 2016, a short new tournament was held, with the teams divided into two zones, the winners of which played the final that crowned the champion. The aim was to return to the European calendar with the biannual tournaments. In the 2016-17 season: a new relegation and promotion regime was implemented: two promotions and 4 relegations, to progressively reduce the number of teams to twenty-two. In 2019, given the Covid-19 pandemic, relegation was suspended for the 2019-20 and 2021 seasons, planned to be resumed at the end of the 2022 season. In the meantime, the promotion of two teams per season has continued, which is gradually increasing the number of participants.

The changes due to Covid were as follows. From 17 March 2020 to 30 March 2020 all games were suspended. After this, there were different measures depending on the province, and only on 30 October 2020 home supporters were allowed to go only to a maximum number (about 30In what regards to visitors' supporters, the idea that they would

Table A.1: Structure of the Seasons

Season	Number of teams			Supporters	
	No. of teams participating	No. of teams relegated	No. of teams promoted	Visiting supporters	Home supporters
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Seasons in the analysis sample					
2011-12	20	2	2	Allowed	Allowed
2012-13	20	2	2	Allowed	Allowed
2013-14	20	2	2	From 06/13: not allowed	Allowed
2014	20	2	2	Not allowed	Allowed
Panel A: Seasons not included in the analysis sample					
2015	30	2	2	Not allowed	Allowed
2016-17	30	4	2	Not allowed	Allowed
2017-18	28	4	2	Not allowed	Allowed
2018-19	26	4	2	Not allowed	Allowed
2019-20 (*)	24	0	2	Not allowed	Allowed
2021	26	0	2	Not allowed	Partially Allowed

This table presents the structure of the Argentinean first division seasons from 2011 to 2021, with the number of teams participating (col. 1), number of teams relegated to second division (col. 2), number of teams from second division promoted to first division (col. 3), and an indication of whether visiting (col. 4) and/or home supporters (col. 5) were allowed in stadiums.

be allowed to come back was latent since 2015 but was never implemented in a systematic way. We are aware that some visitor supporters were allowed to be present, in some games, in a non-random way. Unfortunately, there is no systematic evidence of the games in which this happened. During this time, some visitors would come to the stadium "incognito". In some games, and for some teams, visitors' supporters were allowed to go to the stand of the stadium typically left for visiting supporters. This happened in different ways. In some sporadic games outside the city of Buenos Aires, the visitor supporters were allowed to go to the stands of the stadium dedicated to visitors' supporters. These were some few games, non-randomly chosen typically when a big-5 team visited a small team outside the city of Buenos Aires (e.g. some games that River or Boca played in Mendoza against Godoy Cruz (here), in Mar del Plata against Aldosivi - here, or in Santiago del Estero against Central Córdoba - here). In some other sporadic games, the visitor supporters were allowed to go to the stands of the stadium dedicated to visitors' supporters but as neutral supporters. That means, that these supporters were not be allowed to wear a jersey or flags of their teams, although this rule was only partially abided (see here (August 2022), or here (Feb 2022) . In other cases, in which neither visitors nor neutral supporters were allowed, there were visitor supporters infiltrated among local supports. This became known in the cases when the "infiltrated" supporters were discovered by the police or the local supporters, and triggered violence (for example, here (Dec 2021), and here (August 2022)). All these games were sporadic and carefully chosen.

The decision to play with visitors was discussed and agreed at many levels, game by game, and using data from 2015 onwards would create selection concerns in our study. Moreover, there is no systematic recollection of which games deviated from the "no-visitor ban" rule. This, together with the major changes that occurred from 2015 owners in the organization of the Argentinean football league, make us lead to the conclusion that including data from 2015 in the analysis would be a mistake.

B Additional Descriptive Statistics

Figure B.1: Share of Games Lost by the Visiting Team



This Figure shows the share of games lost by the visiting team in the 590 games played before and the 590 games played after the ban and two linear fits, before and after. Evenly spaced mimicking variance number of bins using spacings estimators.

Table B.1: Visitor Losing - Raw Averages

	Mean (1)	SD (2)	N. of games (3)
Panel A: League Games			
2011-2012 Apertura	.353	.480	190
2011-2012 Clausura	.437	.497	190
2012-2013 Apertura	.411	.493	190
2012-2013 Clausura	.411	.493	190
2013-2014 Apertura	.468	.500	190
2013-2014 Clausura	.458	.499	190
2014	.468	.500	190
Panel B: Cup Games			
2011-2012	.444	.501	63
2012-2013	.491	.504	55
2013-2014	.465	.505	43
2014	.661	.477	62

This table reports the raw averages of the main variable of interest, games ended with a defeat for the visiting team, by half-season for the league games (Panel A) and by season for the cup games (Panel B). Columns (1) reports the average values and Column (2) reports the standard deviations and column (3) the number of games played in each season or half-season.

C ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS

Table C.1: Logit Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Maximum Likelihood Estimation							
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
Presence of the Ban	0.059**	0.059**	0.059**	0.059**	0.027*	0.093***	0.056*	0.111**
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.045)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	856
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	295
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

Maximum likelihood estimation of a Logit model of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table C.2: Main Regression: Twoway Clustering

	OLS Estimation							
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.059^{**}	0.059^{**}	0.059^{*}	0.059^{**}	0.046^{*}	0.087^{***}	0.075^{***}	0.081^{***}
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	25-25	25	25	25-25	25-25
Cluster Home Team		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
Cluster Away Team			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by home and visiting team in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

D TIME CONTROLS

Table D.1: Main Regressions Controlling for Linear Turn Trend

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
OLS Estimation								
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
Presence of the Ban	0.058^{**}	0.058^{**}	0.058^{*}	0.058^{**}	0.045^{*}	0.086^{***}	0.074^{**}	0.080^{*}
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include 1-19 turn of the game in all the specifications (linear trend), dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table D.2: Main Regressions Controlling for Quadratic Turn Trend

	OLS Estimation							
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.057^{**}	0.057^{**}	0.057^{*}	0.057^{**}	0.045^{*}	0.086^{***}	0.074^{**}	0.077^{*}
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include 1-19 turn of the game in all the specifications (quadratic trend), dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table D.3: Main Regressions Controlling for Cubic Turn Trend

	OLS Estimation							
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.058^{**}	0.058^{**}	0.058^{*}	0.058^{**}	0.045^{*}	0.086^{***}	0.074^{**}	0.074^{*}
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include 1-19 turn of the game in all the specifications (cubic trend), dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table D.4: Main Regressions Controlling for Pre-trends Following Goodman-Bacon (2021)

	OLS Estimations							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: First Stage								
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
Matchday	0.008^{**}	0.008^{*}	0.008^{***}	0.008^{**}	0.008^{*}	0.008^{**}	0.008^{**}	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)
N	739	739	739	739	739	739	739	739
Number of Clusters		22	22	443	22	22	443	443
Panel B: Second Stage								
Dependent Variable: *Residuals from the first stage regression*								
Presence of the Ban	0.054^{**}	0.054^{**}	0.054^{*}	0.054^{**}	0.041^{*}	0.082^{***}	0.069^{**}	0.077^{*}
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.042)
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a game for the visiting team, controlling for pre-trends following Goodman-Bacon (2021). Panel A presents results of the first stage regression of the outcome, *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*, on a continuous time trend variable, *Match-day*, and controls, estimated in the pre-ban period. Panel A presents results of the second stage regression of the predicted residuals from first stage regression on the ban dummy and controls using the entire period of the analysis. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

E Additional Results

Table E.1: Effect of the Ban on Goals Scored

	Maximum Likelihood Estimation						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A							
Dependent Variable: *Number of goals scored by the local team*							
Presence of the Ban	1.176	1.176*	1.176	1.176*	1.136	1.291**	1.257*
	(0.117)	(0.106)	(0.142)	(0.114)	(0.108)	(0.166)	(0.148)
Panel B							
Dependent Variable: *Number of goals scored by the visiting team*							
Presence of the Ban	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.948	0.899	0.897
	(0.0964)	(0.100)	(0.106)	(0.0948)	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.112)
Controls							
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓		
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓	
Cluster Match				✓			✓

Panel A: Maximum Likelihood estimation of an Ordered Logit Model of the effect of the ban on the number of goals scored by the home team. Panel B:Maximum Likelihood Estimation of an Ordered Logit Model of the effect of the ban on the number of goals scored by the visiting team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7) and dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Figure E.1: Event Study Coefficients - Copa



This Figure plots OLS estimation coefficients of the effect of the season dummies on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team in Copa games. The *2012-2013 clausura* half season dummy is taken as reference point and is omitted from the regression. Controls include dummies for visiting team. Standard errors are clustered by local and visiting team.

F Subsample Sensitivity Analysis

Table F.1: Main Regressions Excluding Promoted and Relegated Teams Just After the Ban

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
OLS Estimation								
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
Presence of the Ban	0.058*	0.058*	0.058*	0.058*	0.053*	0.069*	0.064*	0.071*
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.042)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	904	904	904	904	904	904	904	904
Number of Clusters		19	19	315	19	19	315	315
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Sample: all games but the ones played by the teams that got promoted or relegated in 2013, i.e. *Independiente, Union Santa Fe, San Martin de Tucumán, Olimpo de Bahía Blanca, GELP and Rosario Central.* Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table F.2: Main Regressions Excluding all Promoted and Relegated Teams During the Time-span of the Study

OLS Estimation								
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.079*	0.079**	0.079*	0.079*	0.080**	0.083*	0.084*	0.093*
	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.054)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Number of Clusters		12	12	132	12	12	132	132
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Sample: all games but the ones played by the teams that got promoted or relegated during the whole analyzed period. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table F.3: Main Regressions Excluding Lanús

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				OLS Estimation				
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
Presence of the Ban	0.052^{*}	0.052^{*}	0.052^{*}	0.052^{*}	0.037	0.081^{**}	0.067^{**}	0.069
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.044)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1197	1197	1197	1197	1197	1197	1197	1197
Number of Clusters		24	24	503	24	24	503	503
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Sample: all games but the ones played by Lanús. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table F.4: Main Regressions Excluding Estudiantes

	OLS Estimation							
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.053*	0.053*	0.053	0.053*	0.038	0.085**	0.071**	0.075*
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.045)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1197	1197	1197	1197	1197	1197	1197	1197
Number of Clusters		24	24	503	24	24	503	503
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Sample: all games but the ones played by Estudiantes. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

G Referee Behavior

Table G.1: Main Regressions Controlling for Red and Yellow Cards

OLS Estimation								
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.058^{**}	0.058^{**}	0.058^{**}	0.058^{**}	0.047^{**}	0.082^{***}	0.071^{**}	0.078^{*}
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.041)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include number of yellow cards awarded to home team, number of yellow cards awarded to visiting team, number of red cards awarded to home team, number of red cards awarded to visiting team, dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table G.2: Main Regressions Controlling for Penalties Awarded

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
OLS Estimation								
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
Presence of the Ban	0.052^{*}	0.052^{**}	0.052^{*}	0.052^{*}	0.040^{*}	0.081^{***}	0.069^{**}	0.075^{*}
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include number of penalties awarded to home team, number of penalties awarded to visiting team, dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table G.3: Main Regressions Controlling for Cards and Penalties Awarded

OLS Estimation

Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.051*	0.051**	0.051*	0.051*	0.040*	0.076**	0.065**	0.072*
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328	1328
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include number of yellow cards awarded to home team, number of yellow cards awarded to visiting team, number of red cards awarded to home team, number of red cards awarded to visiting team, number of penalties awarded to home team, number of penalties awarded to visiting team, dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

H STRATEGY OF MANAGERS

Table H.1: Main Regressions with Half-season and Round Dummies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
OLS Estimation								
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
Presence of the Ban	0.060^{**}	0.060^{**}	0.060^{*}	0.060^{**}	0.046^{*}	0.088^{**}	0.075^{**}	0.075^{*}
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
Dummy Half-Season	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dummies Week/Round	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team controlling for dummy for half-season(Apertura/Clausura), and round dummies (from 1 to 19). Further controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table H.2: Main Regressions with Month Dummies

	OLS Estimation							
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.068**	0.068**	0.068**	0.068**	0.054**	0.096***	0.083***	0.096**
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
Dummies Month	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team controlling for month dummies. Further controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table H.3: Main Regressions Controlling for Lineups

OLS Estimation								
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.056**	0.056**	0.056*	0.056**	0.050**	0.081***	0.076**	0.079*
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.041)
Jaccard Home to Home	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Jaccard Home to Visiting	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Jaccard Visiting to Home	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Jaccard Visiting to Visiting	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.005	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.006*	-0.006**	-0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Jaccard home(visiting) to home[visiting] refers to the similarity index between the lineup of the home(visiting) team to the other lineups of the same team in its home[visiting] games. The number of observations corresponds to the number of games with exactly 11 starting players per team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table H.4: Main Regressions Controlling for Market Value

	OLS Estimation							
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presence of the Ban	0.059**	0.059**	0.059*	0.059**	0.048*	0.086***	0.075**	0.080*
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Market Value Home Team	0.050**	0.050**	0.050**	0.050**	0.000	0.050**	0.003	-0.003
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.041)
Market Value Visiting Team	-0.067***	-0.067***	-0.067***	-0.067***	-0.068***	-0.010	-0.012	-0.017
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.037)
Dummies Home Team					✓		✓	
Dummies Visiting Team						✓	✓	
Dummies Match								✓
N	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330	1330
Number of Clusters		25	25	550	25	25	550	550
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓			
Cluster Visiting Team			✓			✓		
Cluster Match				✓			✓	✓

OLS estimation of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Market Value refers to the average value of a single player in million euros. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for game in Column (8). Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by game interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

I HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS - GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE

Figure I.1: Heterogeneous Effects: The *Big-5*



This Figure plots OLS estimation coefficients of the effect of the effect of the ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team interacting the effect with (i) the home team being among the best five teams in the league, (ii) the visiting team being among the best five teams in the league and (ii) both teams being among the best five teams in the league. Controls include dummies for visiting team. Standard errors are clustered by visiting team.

J Covid-19 Pandemic

Table J.1: Effect of the Covid-19 Closed-stadium Ban

OLS Estimation						
Dependent Variable: *Dummy for losing/not losing a match for the visiting team*						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Covid Period	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054	-0.053	-0.052
	(0.055)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.049)
Dummies Home Team					✓	
Dummies Away Team						✓
N	325	325	325	325	325	325
Number of Clusters		26	26	325	26	26
Cluster Home Team		✓			✓	
Cluster Away Team			✓			✓
Cluster Match				✓		

OLS estimation of the effect of the Covid-19 ban on the probability of losing a game for the visiting team. Controls include dummies for home team in Columns (5) and (7), dummies for visiting team in Columns (6) and (7), and dummies for match in Column (8). The Sample used concerns all the games played in the First Division Argentinean League in 2021. Beta coefficients reported and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by home team in Columns (2) and (5), by visiting team in Columns (3) and (6) and by match interaction in Columns (4), (7) and (8). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

K Market Value of Teams

Table K.2: Number of Players with Reported Market Value by Team

	Season			
Club	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**
Atlético de Rafaela	7	10	16	22
Club Atlético Boca Juniors	12	18	12	21
Estudiantes de La Plata	17	9	13	20
Club Atlético Rosario Central			8	20
Quilmes Atlético Club		5	13	18
Club Atlético Banfield	5			17
Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima La Plata			12	16
Defensa y Justicia				14
Club Deportivo Godoy Cruz	3	3	1	14
CA Independiente de Avellaneda	8	15		14
Arsenal de Sarandí FC	2	3	10	14
Club Atlético Lanús	9	13	5	13
Club Atlético Newell's Old Boys	8	9	9	12
Club Atlético Vélez Sarsfield	8	11	12	11
Olimpo de Bahía Blanca	7		6	10
Club Atlético River Plate		16	15	9
Racing Club de Avellaneda	5	11	9	9
Belgrano de Córdoba	4	3	10	5
Club Atlético Tigre	5	10	7	4
Club Atlético San Lorenzo de Almagro	8	9	8	2
CA Unión Santa Fé	4	8		
Argentinos Juniors	14	13	17	
Club Atlético Colón (Santa Fe)	8	5	13	
Club Atlético San Martín (SJ)	6	6		
CA All Boys Buenos Aires	11	13	18	
Average	**7.55**	**9.5**	**10.7**	**13.25**

This table reports the number of players for which we have a market value by team and season. The sample includes all the 820 players of teams playing in the First Argentinean League during the period of the analysis and reported in the Transfermarkt database with a player value greater than 0.

Table K.3: Average Market Value by Team

	Season			
Club	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**
Club Atlético Boca Juniors	839,583	1,059,722	1,833,333	2,800,000
Club Atlético River Plate		3,112,500	2,096,667	2,377,778
Club Atlético Rosario Central			350,000	1,153,750
CA Independiente de Avellaneda	1,168,750	378,333		1,078,571
Racing Club de Avellaneda	3,610,000	775,000	694,444	919,444
Club Atlético Vélez Sarsfield	831,250	868,182	416,667	818,182
Club Atlético Lanús	1,266,111	469,231	580,000	801,923
Estudiantes de La Plata	1,705,882	433,333	551,923	703,750
Club Atlético Newell's Old Boys	321,875	515,000	2,433,333	679,167
Club Atlético Banfield	225,000			667,647
Club Deportivo Godoy Cruz	333,333	475,000	25,000	428,571
Atlético de Rafaela	335,714	642,500	368,750	402,273
Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima La Plata			739,583	362,500
Olimpo de Bahía Blanca	221,429		212,500	350,000
Defensa y Justicia				266,071
Quilmes Atlético Club		270,000	592,308	265,278
Arsenal de Sarandí FC	32,500	216,667	182,500	251,786
Belgrano de Córdoba	1,662,500	966,667	332,500	205,000
Club Atlético San Lorenzo de Almagro	896,875	2,061,111	1,475,000	200,000
Club Atlético Tigre	435,000	297,500	557,143	106,250
Club Atlético San Martín (SJ)	341,667	408,333		
Argentinos Juniors	426,786	792,308	794,118	
CA All Boys Buenos Aires	420,455	298,077	1,000,000	
Club Atlético Colón (Santa Fe)	450,000	550,000	653,846	
CA Unión Santa Fé	387,500	246,875		
Average	**795,611**	**741,817**	**794,481**	**741,897**

This figure reports the average market value of football players by team and season. The sample includes all the 820 players of teams playing in the First Argentinean League during the period of the analysis and reported in the Transfermarkt database with a player value greater than 0.